In May 2026, Russia ran a newly announced exercise involving its strategic nuclear forces. The drill was designed to rehearse nuclear launch in response to a hypothetical external attack, including one of a conventional nature. This activity followed a test launch on May 12 and formed part of what the memo describes as a broader pattern: it was the second major nuclear forces exercise in the same month.

A key analytical point in the memo is timing. The exercise window overlapped closely with developments that were detrimental to Russia in its war against Ukraine. While the memo assesses that the likelihood of the exercise being used as a pretext for an imminent nuclear escalation against Ukraine was relatively low, it argues that the drill still must be taken seriously by Germany and other NATO allies.

On implications for European security, the memo emphasizes that Russia’s nuclear signaling increases the importance of NATO’s conventional deterrence. Strong conventional capabilities are presented as a way to complicate Russia’s “escalate to de-escalate” logic by reducing the space for limited nuclear threats to offset potential conventional vulnerabilities. The memo specifically links this need to investment in deep-precision-strike capabilities to credibly threaten high-value military targets below the nuclear threshold.

The memo also argues Germany faces a capability and expertise gap for nuclear deterrence matters. It cites the cancellation by the United States of planned deployment of long-range fire systems to Germany as increasing urgency for Germany and its allies to close this gap. It notes that while those systems would have carried conventional warheads, they could strengthen deterrence by threatening infrastructure critical to Russian military operations and supporting nuclear architecture (such as strategic air bases and command centers). The memo further suggests that in the short term, partner procurement options could partially and temporarily address the gap, while longer-term investments in European programs would be needed for a sustainable indigenous capability base.

Finally, it discusses policy actions Germany can take and the broader deterrence signaling message Europe should send. It recommends practical steps such as improving regular French nuclear consultation formats with non-nuclear European allies, running joint scenario-based exercises, and supporting visible peacetime deployments of French nuclear-capable aircraft to allied bases—framing these measures as conveying political meaning to Moscow about costs of nuclear coercion against Europe. The memo adds that clearer NATO messaging should deny Russia the assumption that aggression against alliance territory can be conducted while shielding key military infrastructure on its own territory from allied responses.