Dutch strategic industries sit at the intersection of economic value and national resilience. Because these sectors rely on advanced know-how, supply-chain dependencies, and trusted partnerships, they can become targets for influence that is not limited to overt political messaging. Instead, interference can be operationalized through commercial behavior, talent pipelines, research collaborations, and controlled access to information and standards.

This report argues that Chinese influence efforts should be understood as a long-term process rather than isolated incidents. The central concern is not only espionage or direct coercion, but also the shaping of incentives and decision-making inside companies and institutions that operate in sensitive technological domains. Tactics and pathways of influence 1) Relationship-building and network access

A recurring pattern in foreign interference activity is the creation of durable networks. Chinese actors may invest in relationships with industry leaders, research communities, and intermediaries who can provide entry into meetings, committees, procurement channels, and technical working groups. Over time, these connections can translate into privileged access or soft leverage. 2) Investment, partnerships, and market shaping

Chinese participation in Dutch strategic sectors—through minority stakes, joint ventures, supplier agreements, or long-term commercial partnerships—can introduce dependencies. Even without control, these arrangements may influence strategic priorities by steering investment choices, shaping procurement preferences, or supporting market narratives that align with external interests. 3) Information and technology access strategies

In technology-heavy industries, interference efforts can focus on gaining selective visibility into capabilities, roadmaps, and operational details. This may involve negotiating research collaboration terms, using subcontractors to obtain targeted knowledge, or encouraging staff exchanges that deepen technical familiarity while potentially widening exposure to sensitive know-how. 4) Policy and standards influence through indirect channels

Influence can extend beyond corporate decisions into the ecosystem that shapes regulation and standards. By engaging via industry associations, conference participation, expert networks, and informal consultations, external actors may help normalize certain technical preferences, interpretive frameworks, or compliance approaches that indirectly affect how strategic industries operate. 5) Talent recruitment and human-capital leverage

Human capital is an operational asset. Recruitment efforts—formal or informal—can be used to build expertise links between institutions. While academic and professional mobility is legitimate, interference risks increase when collaboration is paired with asymmetric obligations, unclear security boundaries, or information asymmetries. Sector focus: why “strategic” matters

Strategic industries have at least one of the following characteristics:

They underpin critical infrastructure or public safety. They depend on cutting-edge research and proprietary technology. They host bottlenecks in supply chains, manufacturing, or specialized services. They influence national economic security and strategic autonomy.

Because these industries combine sensitive capabilities with ongoing international collaboration, they can be especially vulnerable to influence that exploits normal business and research processes. Implications for the Netherlands

The report’s core message is that resilience requires treating interference risk as a whole-of-ecosystem issue. This includes companies, research institutions, regulators, and intermediaries.

Key implications often include:

Stronger due diligence for partnerships involving sensitive technologies and supply chains. Clearer governance and risk controls around research collaborations and access to technical roadmaps. Greater scrutiny of investment structures that create long-term dependency without overt control. Improved coordination between private-sector security, compliance functions, and public authorities.